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Abstract The exchange of data along the supply chain can be viewed as 
one of the key characteristics of advanced manufacturing concepts, 
frequently labeled as industry 4.0 . Intelligent products produced in shorter 
life cycles, increasing cost and quality pressures from global supply chains, 
increasingly complex regulatory requirements, as well as decreasing costs 
of advanced sensors are major drivers for this trend. Large amounts of 
data generated as a by-product of this trend represents an opportunity for 
advanced data analytics. However, the exchange of data across 
organizational boundaries bears also the risks of being in the focus of 
cyber-attacks. In this paper, we tackle the challenge of securing the data 
transfer in an Industry 4.0 environment. We first identify the security 
requirements within our use case. Based on these requirements, we present 
an approach for secure data transmission and discuss how our solution 
meets the identified requirements. 
 
Keywords: • Digitalization • Secure architecture • Data transmission • 






CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Matej Vuković, MSc, Evolaris next level GmbH, Graz, Austria, e-
mail: matej.vukovic@evolaris.net. Christian Kittl, Ph.D., Evolaris next level GmbH, Graz, Austria, 
e-mail: christian.kittl@evolaris.net. Jürgen Mangler, Center for Digital Production, Wien, Austria, 
juergen.mangler@univie.ac.at. Stefan Thalmann, PhD, University of Graz, Graz, Austria, e-mail: 
stefan.thalmann@uni-graz.at. 
 
DOI https://doi.org/10.18690/978-961-286-280-0.60    ISBN 978-961-286-280-0 
Dostopno na: http://press.um.si
1110 32
ND BLED ECONFERENCE  




The exchange of data along the supply chain can be viewed as one of the key 
characteristics of advanced manufacturing concepts, e.g. industry 4.0 
(Kagermann, 2015). Intelligent products produced in shorter life cycles, 
increasing cost and quality pressures from global supply chains and increasingly 
complex regulatory requirements are major drivers for this trend (Kache & 
Seuring, 2017). Additionally, inexpensive sensors enable companies to collect 
more and more data about even more diverse aspects of their production lines 
and affordable cloud-based services to store or compute these data. This 
however leads to big data sets which cannot be processed by human experts 
anymore. For this purpose, data analytics promise huge advantages. However, 
the exchange of data across organizational boundaries bears also the risks of 
being in the focus of cyber-attacks (Stjepandić, Liese & Trappey, 2015) or the 
risks of losing competitive knowledge or of revealing business insights to other 
companies or even to competitors (Ilvonen et al., 2018). Both threats (1) to be a 
possible target of a cyber-attack  and (2) not to know which business insights or 
critical knowledge an external part can derive from shared data are major 
concerns of organizations in general (North et al., 2019).  
 
To allow digital innovations by fostering digitization, companies have to balance 
the benefits expected from digitization and the risks may arising from those 
technologies (Thalmann & Ilvonen, 2018). As manufacturing data is the core of 
manufacturing companies’ competitive advantage, security systems need to be 
developed to prevent unauthorized access to data and thus to reduce the risk of 
digitization (Thoben, Stefan, & Wuest, 2017). The challenge in this regard is, that 
data comes from different types of Internet of Things (IOT) devices and sensors 
and all of these devices need to be connected but often they are not designed 
with security in mind. As a result of this situation, the connection between these 
heterogeneous systems is often vulnerable, especially in a cross-plant scenario. 
 
In the work of (Priller et al., 2014)  migration of the existing industrial devices 
into the world of Smart Services was discussed and initial guide was developed 
for establishing efficient and secure interaction between different production 
subsystems. (Maritsch et al., 2015) show the superiority of MQTT over other 
protocols for the secure device connection in the context of smart factories. In 
the work of (Lesjak et al., 2015) a connection between devices on the field and 
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the message broker was discussed. After it was shown how to securely connect 
and authenticate devices, an approach for data encryption on a single device was 
proposed in (Lesjak et al., 2016). (Maritsch et al., 2016) propose different message 
broker architectures. However, neither of them can be applied in our use case 
for various reasons (existing data transmission mechanisms in place, customer 
owns the data storage, etc.). Hence, we want to investigate how a system 





In our research we are following a Design Science Research Methodology 
(Hevner et al., 2004) (Clarke, 2017) (K. Peffers et al., 2007). In the relevance cycle 
we have identified the challenge of securing the data transmission within the 
Industry 4.0 use-case. Specifically, we investigated the case of the Smart Factory 
Vienna and first identified the security requirements. In our design cycle, we 
defined the requirements and the objectives of the new solution in the Use-Case 
section of this paper. In our rigor cycle, we researched the literature for existing 
solutions and approaches suitable for our identified design problem.  
 
The current architectural solutions did not satisfy the requirements and 
objectives of the current use-case. Hence, we designed and developed a new 
architectural solution for the secure data transfer that is described in detail in The 
Proposed Solution section. This solution is then demonstrated in the “Pilotfabrik 




The “Pilotfabrik Industrie 4.0” in Vienna is a demonstrator plant that also 
produces parts for customers. Artefacts to exemplify production in the context 
of this paper are: 
 
• EMCO MaxxTurn 45 lathe, integrated OPCUA server. 
• ABB IRB 2600 industrial robot, ABB specific interface. 
• Neobotics AGV, proprietary REST interface. 
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• UI to enter part measurements running on a Raspberry PI 3B+, 
proprietary REST interface. 
• Inateck QR Code Scanner connected to a Raspberry PI 3B+, proprietary 






Artefacts consist of hardware and software that either produces data streams, or 
can be polled for data points. Each Artefact is wrapped by an adapter that pushes 
the data stream to an Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) 
server, where it is available for consumption. The individual artefacts are 
independent, they do not know anything of each other. All logic how the 
machines interact are handled by a cloud based cell orchestration solution, in this 
case by centurio.work (Pauker, 2018). Centurio.work instantiates and executes 
process models, in order to (1) produce a specific part, (2) collect data from all 
participated artefacts during production, and (3) ensure that all artefacts work 
correctly together during production. On the left-hand side an example process 
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is depicted. In the example process an operator scans a QR code, which results 
in the production of a batch of products, which are loaded on to a tray on top of 
an AGV. The AGV the delivers the batch of parts to the operator which can 
measure the compliance with tolerances, and separate good from bad parts. 
 
The network inside the Pilotfabrik is in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) and deemed 
problematic, as many parties share same network / have access to network ports.  
 
Based on this setting the following requirements can been elicited: 
 
• Low Latency / high performance: the collected data is used to 
coordinate Machines, and to show real-time data about the production. 
The machines produce up to 2 MiB per second. 
• Tamperproof Data Flow: the customers demand a detailed protocol 
about production for long-time warranty issues. Furthermore, tampering 
with data could lead to potentially fatal decisions for the interaction 
between the machines. 
• Quality of service has to be ensured.  
• Identity spoofing / man in the middle attacks should be prohibited by 
introducing transport layer security, and end-to-end encryption. 
 
All the machines are configured so that the above-mentioned wrapper is the only 
means of accessing the machine. The wrapper is thus necessary to (1) deny access 
to potentially insecure resources, (2) deal with no-routable protocols. 
 
4 The Proposed Solution 
 
In this section we describe our proposed architecture of our approach and how 
it satisfies the requirements defined in the use case. In the following text our 
approach is described in a single tenant context. However, multi-tenant 
application is possible with minimal extensions to the proposed architecture. 
Overview of the architecture of our approach is shown in the figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Architecture of the proposed approach  
 
To satisfy the requirements defined in the use case we developed a secure data 
transmission infrastructure based on Message Queuing Telemetry Transport 
(MQTT). MQTT is providing a lightweight publish/subscribe message transport 
(Lampkin et al., 2012). We base our work on top of solutions proposed in (Lesjak 
et al., 2016), (Maritsch et al., 2016), (Priller et al., 2014) and (Lesjak et al., 2015). 
Selection of this technology reflected on other elements of the proposed 
architecture. Aside from the selection of MQTT as a base communication 
technology, architecture was designed around non-intrusiveness and ease of 
integration into the currently running system. In this sense customer sends and 
receives the data in non-encrypted, plain text form and message encryption, 
message decryption, message integrity, client authorization and other security 
tasks are handled by the subsystems of the secure data transmission architecture. 
Data exchange is secured in two layers.  
 
In the first layer data is secured using Transport Layer Security (TLS). This 
protocol provides data encryption, data integrity checks and client authentication 
on the transport layer. Client authentication is required whenever one of the 
clients initiates a connection to the message broker. Using this mechanism, we 
make sure that the subsystems on both endpoints are authenticated and only 
selected subsystems can send or receive the data. However, this layer only secures 
single connections, as single connections are secured, by using only TLS data is 
decrypted when received by the broker and encrypted again when establishing 
the connection with the subscriber. To prevent from data being exposed in the 
scenario of the broker being compromised we introduce second security layer to 
the architecture.  
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Second security layer in the proposed approach is end-to-end encryption. In this 
layer devices that publish the data have predefined set of recipients and their 
public keys which they use to encrypt the data and create a so-called envelope. 
For each of the recipients, data is encrypted with their public key and upon 
receiving the data they can decrypt it using their private key. This approach 
creates a reasonable overhead that is a result of the multiplication of the 
encrypted data. Multiplication of data is happening because the encrypted 
message is created for each of the recipients defined on the side of the devices 
that publish the data. In our use case this overhead is avoided by using only one 
recipient that is the processing backend.  
Our approach consists of several subsystems and in the following subsections 
these subsystems are described. 
 
4.1 Message Broker 
 
Message broker is a central component of our approach. Based on (Maritsch et 
al., 2016), we propose a new broker architecture making the integration as non-
intrusive as possible and to leverage the advantages of the currently implemented 
infrastructure. The hybrid architecture uses one main message broker that 
contains a root Certificate Authority and two message brokers on the sending 
and the receiving end of the data transmission pipeline. Devices on the sending 
and receiving end of the architecture are located onsite in the DMZ. Message 
broker has two roles. On the one hand it mediates communication between 
MQTT clients (Lampkin et al., 2012) and is responsible for receiving messages, 
filtering and sending messages to the clients that are subscribed to them. On the 
other hand, within the infrastructure that message broker is running on, a  Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) is created and it contains a root Certificate Authority. 
Root Certificate Authority signs all other generated certificates for each of the 
devices and clients in the data transmission pipeline. This results in a secure and 
trusting architecture where all of the clients must be authenticated by the 
certificate signed by the root Certificate Authority. If the client is not 
authenticated the connection to the message broker cannot be established. 
 
With these mechanisms in place this approach allows only predefined clients to 
connect to the message broker and only predefined message receivers to decrypt 
the data. To make the integration efforts low no topics were defined in the 
message broker.  
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4.2 MQTT Clients 
 
In our approach MQTT Clients represent subsystems that are in charge 
of  sending the data (publishers) and receiving the data (subscribers). Both are 
single-board computers that have enough processing power for the tasks of 
encryption and decryption and running a Linux distribution.  
 
For the devices that are sending the data we use a concept called Mediator (Priller 
et al., 2014). A Mediator is a gateway device that provides a modular extension 
to existing machines. It includes necessary computation and communication 
resources and can be connected with the machines via several interfaces. Usage 
of the Mediator addresses the legacy aspect of the machines by extending their 
functionality by enabling them to connect to the internet and encrypting the data. 
It also addresses the transparency aspect by enabling the customers to filter the 
data and select what do they want to transmit. Mediator device aggregates the 
production data produced by the machine, encrypts it, establishes the connection 
with the message broker and sends the aggregated data to the message broker. 
 
5 Conclusion and outlook 
 
Within this design science project we tackled the challenge of securing the data 
transfer in an Industry 4.0 use-case. We have developed an design artefact that 
satisfies the identified requirements. In our use case four requirements were 
defined: (1) low latency and high performance, (2) tamperproof data flow, (3) 
quality of service, (4) prevention of identity spoofing and man in the middle 
attacks. First requirement, (1) low latency and high performance, is addressed in 
related work (Lesjak et al., 2016) and proposed architecture and mediator devices 
provide reasonable and acceptable overhead. Second requirement, (2) 
tamperproof data flow, is addressed from several aspects. One aspect is TLS 
encryption and client authentication which ensures that only defined clients 
publish and subscribe to messages. Furthermore, end-to-end encryption ensures 
that data is transferred in the original state and no changes can be made to it 
without detection. Finally, mediator devices are connected to the machines via 
non-routable protocols and in the case of this devices being compromised, 
attacker is not able to penetrate the network. Requirement (3) quality of service 
is addressed by-design as a part of the MQTT protocol. Last requirement, (4) 
prevention of identity spoofing and man in the middle attack is addressed with 
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the usage of TLS and client authentication and end-to-end encryption. Client 
authentication enables connection establishment to only those clients that have 
certificates signed by the root Certificate Authority. TLS on the other hand 
secures the connection to the message broker and from the message broker and 
encrypting and enveloping the data from sending end to the receiving end 
ensures that only receiving client can decrypt the data.  
 
In future work we want to evaluate and benchmark the architecture in the pilot 
factory “Pilotfabrik Industrie 4.0”, starting in June 2019. The system evaluation 
will be based on measuring the impact of securing the data transmission 
infrastructure compared to the insecure data transmission. Especially impact on 
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